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We examine multinationals’ optimal entry modes into foreign markets as a function of market 
size, FDI fixed costs, tariffs and transport costs. Our results highlight why large countries are 
more likely to attract acquisition investment, while intermediate-sized countries may be 
served predominantly through trade, even in the presence of high tariffs. Small countries are 
most likely to experience either FDI or no entry. We also show how these results vary with 
the competition intensity in the host country.  
FDI fixed costs, tariffs and transport costs are crucial not only in determining whether to 
engage in FDI or trade, but they are also shown to influence the acquisition choice as trade 
and FDI threats influence the acquisition price. Finally we explore the welfare implications of 
tariff reductions for both the local firm and the multinational and investigate political motives 
to impose endogenous tariffs that influence not only the welfare of a local firm, but also the 
entry mode of the multinational.  
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Eastern Europe provided a natural experiment to examine multinationals' (MNCs’) 
entry decisions, as transition economies were largely closed to trade, investment and 
acquisition until the late 1980s.  In the following decade, the subsequent pattern of 
MNCs’ entry proved to be much more diverse than initially predicted.
1  A s  M N C s ’  
FDI/acquisition and export patterns differed so remarkably across transition economies, 
the analysis of the determinants of MNCs’ entry modes received renewed interest (e.g., 
UN 1999; World Bank 2002).
2  In this paper we seek to examine how market structure, 
market size, tariffs and transport costs influence the entry behavior of MNCs.   
The previous theoretical literature on MNC entry modes is separated into three 
important areas.  One strand examines FDI/multiplant-production (e.g., Dunning 1981, 
Ethier 1986, Markusen 1984, Helpman 1984, 1985).  A second set of models explores 
strategic aspects of the FDI/trade decision, such as tariff jumping FDI (e.g., Magee 1977, 
Horstmann and Markusen 1992, Motta 1992, Buckley and Casson 1998), and a third 
category analyzes the choice between FDI and acquisition/joint ventures (e.g., Hennart 
and Park, 1993, Smarzynska, 2000, and Mueller, 2001) in the absence of tariffs and 
transport costs.  We combine key aspects of each of the previous approaches to construct 
one integrated theoretical framework that allows for all three entry modes.  This allows 
                                                 
1 The incentives for entry based on new and expanding markets, skilled labor, and (to a lesser degree) low 
labor costs as well as the surprising diversity of investments and entry modes across countries is 
documented in many surveys, e.g., Collins and Rodrik (1991), EBRD (1994), Meyer (2001), and Lankes 
and Venables (1996).   
2 Empirical models of entry modes include Lu (2002), Meyer (2001) and Davis, Desai and Francis (2000) 
who investigate institutional aspects, Henisz (2000), who examines political hazards, Shenkar (2001) and 
Brouthers and Brouthers (2001) who focus on cultural distance, Meyer and Estrin (2001) and 
Siripaisalpipat and Hoshino (2000) who examine the importance of resource transfers and MNC’s specific 
advantages, and Brouthers, Brouthers and Werner (1999), who investigate the importance of Dunning's 
(1981) OLI variables.  
  1us to examine the determinants of MNCs’ entry decisions as a function of tariffs/transport 
costs, FDI fixed costs, market size and market structure.  
Our results indicate that entry decisions can be conveniently grouped by the degree of 
competition (or product differentiation). High degrees of competition reduce the 
likelihood that MNCs coexist with local firms, as the low cost producer is poised to 
remain the monopoly supplier. Sufficiently weak competition allows for coexistence and 
rich strategic entry mode interaction between local firms and MNCs.  This result finds 
empirical support in World Bank (1999) where differential trade and FDI experiences of 
transition economies are explained by the degree of monopoly protection and tariff 
protection during the early stages of privatization, and by differential degrees of 
willingness of countries to bow to EU and WTO pressures to increase competition and 
lower tariffs.  Collins and Rodrik (1991) report survey results that indicate the importance 
of market structure as a perceived attraction for investment in Eastern Europe. 
If an MNC enters, we show that the entry mode depends on investment costs, 
tariff/transportation costs, competition and local market size.  Not surprisingly, trade 
entry declines in tariffs and transport costs, giving rise to FDI, acquisition, or no-entry 
depending on fixed costs and market size.  The fact that not only tariffs, but also transport 
costs matter is a key finding of Collins and Rodrik (1991), who show that proximity to 
the EU is an important aspect in the decision to export or invest.   
FDI, in contrast, is shown to decline in fixed costs, inducing trade, acquisition, or no-
entry, depending on market size and degree of competition.  Acquisitions increase in 
monopoly profits and market size, especially if FDI and Trade can be used as entry 
threats.  These results confirm the findings summarized in Markusen’s (1995) survey of 
  2MNCs’ entry decisions that FDI increases relative to trade when tariffs and transport 
costs are high.  Below we extend this result and highlight its dependence on the degree of 
competition and fixed costs.   
Trade entry is shown to be most likely in countries that are located close to the 
MNC’s production location, impose low tariffs, or represent intermediate sized markets.  
In large markets, it is optimal for the MNC to use trade or FDI threats to acquire the local 
firm and become a monopoly supplier.  In small markets, with little demand and low 
goods prices, acquisitions and trade become unlikely in the face of tariffs because an 
MNC is unable to recover the acquisition price or marginal production costs.  In such 
small markets FDI is only possible if fixed costs are extremely low or competition (and 
hence the MNC’s cost advantage) is significant.  Lankes and Venables (1996) confirm 
that the host country’s market size is a driving force behind the FDI in Eastern Europe.   
Our results regarding the relationship between investment/trade cost and the MNC’s 
incentive for FDI/trade entry are akin to Horstmann and Markusen’s (1992) who consider 
the emergence of an MNC in identical countries within homogeneous goods.  The added 
dimension here is that we further differentiate the Horstmann and Markusen results as a 
function of market size, competition and investment/trade costs. Furthermore we offer the 
MNC an additional entry mode by allowing for acquisition. 
Buckley and Casson (1998) extend Motta’s (1992) export/FDI analysis to include 
licensing, to find that tariffs and transport costs encourage FDI, while Hill, et al (1990) 
find that the existence of large monopoly rents favors acquisition over FDI.  These results 
are akin to ours, for given levels of investment/trade costs and market sizes.  We then 
  3allow investment/trade costs and market size to vary and observe the resulting dynamic 
changes in entry decisions. 
Hennart and Park (1993) examine the choice between FDI and acquisition, predicting 
that higher rates of growth in the target market increase investors’ incentives to enter 
through acquisition.  This confirms Mueller’s (2001) results and our case of the 
prohibitive tariffs.  If tariffs are low, however, relatively large markets may well be 
served by trade or FDI, depending on the relative size of fixed costs and the degree of 
competition.  
  We then proceed to examine the trade and welfare implications associated with 
different entry modes and tariff levels.  The analysis reveals the surprising result that the 
local firm may not always be harmed by lowered tariffs. Clearly, an exporting MNC is 
better off as tariffs are lowered if it chooses trade over FDI.  This welfare gain translates 
into the usual welfare loss for the import competing local firm.  If lowered tariffs and 
trade creation induce MNCs to switch to trade rather than choose FDI, prices in the local 
market may rise.  Local firms may indeed benefit from such a tariff reduction, if the price 
gains outweigh market share losses.  
Lastly we investigate how political pressures may give rise to endogenous tariffs that 
influence MNCs’ entry modes.  We employ Hillman’s political support approach where 
policy makers weigh political support from local firms and consumers. We show that the 
endogenous tariff renders governments more likely to impose tariffs in sectors that 
feature relatively inefficient (efficient) local firms (MNCs).  Tariffs also increase in the 
competition intensity of an industry, except in very large markets in which governments 
put strong emphasis on firm profits.  The model provides theoretical support that larger 
  4markets should experience freer trade, hence rapidly expanding markets also provide less 
of an incentive for governments to impose tariffs. 
It is important to add that the data on MNC expansion strategies reflect more 
strategies than any model can hope to capture.  Hanson, Mataloni and Slaughter (2001) 
provide empirical evidence that tariff induced FDI, acquisition, as well as exports are 
important.  Their work highlights the importance of re-exporting (see also Feenstra and 
Hanson 2001), outsourcing (Feenstra and Hanson 1996), distribution oriented FDI, and 
the simultaneity of FDI, acquisition and export strategies.  Re-exporting is a serious issue 
for all empirical work on MNC location.  The re-export option could occur naturally in 
the model below, if we extended the model to three countries and allowed the MNC’s 
FDI to lower production costs.  From the intuition of the model we can conjecture that 
MNC’s would relocate to lower production cost and geographically speaking the 
relocation would take place near large markets that have high fixed costs and low tariffs.  
The formal extension is not considered below because of the complexity of the game in 
the case of a three-country model.  Outsourcing FDI has not been considered because the 
model lacks any vertical integration structure.  Both extensions are left for future 
research.  
 
2. The Model 
  Our formal structure below extends Mueller (2001) to allow for international trade 
and transport costs, which allows us to examine the dynamics of a three stage entry game 
between a local firm and its MNC rival.  We assume that both firms have Bertrand 
conjectures about the rival’s actions.  At the first stage, the MNC has four options. It can 
  5submit a take-it-or-leave-it offer to acquire the local firm, implement FDI, export the 
good, or refrain from entering the market.
3 If the MNC acquires the local firm, it becomes 
the monopoly producer.  At the second stage, the local firm accepts or rejects the 
acquisition offer. If the offer is rejected, the MNC chooses between FDI, trade, or no 
entry in a third stage. To derive the MNC’s optimal entry mode, we search for sub-game 
perfect equilibria through backward induction.  
  The local firm produces with constant marginal cost, cL, while the MNC possesses an 
ownership advantage represented by cM < cL.  If the MNC engages in FDI, it incurs fixed 
costs,  k, and marginal cost cM.
4 In contrast, MNC exports are subject to tariffs and 
transport costs, τ and σ , respectively, which raise the MNC's marginal production cost 
to  σ τ + + = M T c c . Depending on the level of tariffs/transport costs, cT may or may not 
exceed cL. 
  For now we assume that the MNC continues to employ the existing, local technology 
with production cost cL if the local firm is acquired. Hence, acquisition never leads to a 
cost advantage, only to monopoly status. The acquisition costs equal the local firm’s 
expected profits, which in turn depend crucially on the MNC’s mode of entry.
5  
Following Hotelling’s Linear City model, consumers are uniformly distributed along the 
[0,1] interval, and goods are differentiated in the sense that consumers pay the price plus 
                                                 
3 For the purposes of this paper we separate MNCs’ foreign investment into “acquisition” and FDI.   
Acquisition is assumed to be the take over of a foreign firm and FDI is taken as synonym for a new 
investment (the literature also refers to such FDI also as “greenfield investment”).  Portfolio investment is 
not considered, nor is FDI for re-export purposes. 
4 Examples of such fixed costs could be production related infrastructure or institutional costs (such as a 
lack of transparency in laws, regulations and systems).  The cost k could also be set up cost for the 
investment itself.  
5 Other possible assumptions, such as lower marginal cost if the local firm is acquired, are certainly 
possible but not considered here to limit the complexity of the model. 
  6a travel cost, t, to the firm location.
6  As travel costs increase, competition between the 
two firms falls.  Agents consume zero or one unit of the good to attain a gross consumers’ 
surplus, s. Broadly speaking, s is a measure of the size of the local market.  Let pL and pF 
denote the prices charged by the local firm and the MNC, respectively, where the 
subscripts   represent M in the case of FDI, and T in case of export.   T M F , =  
  The gross price to a consumer who shops at the local firm with coordinate x  is 
, while the gross price at the MNC is  tx pL + ( ) 1 F p tx + − . Hence, in the case of FDI or 
trade, the net utility of a consumer located at x is 







goods   MNC for      ) 1 (
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In the case of acquisition, the net utility of a consumer located at x is 
        tx p s U F − − =      (2) 
  When the market size is sufficiently large, each firm can set the price level according 
to its best response posture towards its rival. Markets with insufficient demand may not 
allow for a best response, in which case firms simply revert to maximizing monopoly 
profits.  
  In large and intermediate markets, profit levels of the local firm and the MNC under 
the MNC’s entry are represented by 
        (3) 
  2 / ) )( ( ) , (
2 / ) )( ( ) , (
Ik t  t p p c p p p
t t p p c p p p
F L F F F L F
L F L L F L L
− + − − =
+ − − =
π
π
                                                 
6 Since linear transportation costs rule out pure-strategy price equilibria when firms locate inside the 
interval (Tirole p.280), we focus only on the tractable case where both firms locate at the extreme end of 
the line. 
  7where I is the indicator function set to unity only when the MNC engages in FDI.  The 
associated equilibrium prices are  3 / ) 3 2 ( t c c p F L L + + =  and  3 / ) 3 2 ( t c c p L F F + + =  in 
large markets, and  6 / ) 3t c c L F ( s pL + − − =  and  6 / ) 3 ( t c c s F L + − pF − =  for 
intermediate markets where firms’ prices are restricted by demand. 
  When markets are too small to allow for a best response, the local firm engages in 
monopolistic pricing while the MNC sets its price level to cover the residual markets. 
This yields profits of   
          ( 3 a )  
Ik t s c t c p p p
t c s c p p
L F F F L F
L L L L L
− − + − =
− − =
2 / ) 2 )( ( ) , (
2 / ) )( ( ) (
π
π
which are associated with prices  2 / ) ( L L c s p + =  and  2 / ) 2 3 ( L F c t s p − − = .
7        
  If the MNC acquires the local firm, the local firm’s disposition proceeds are equal to 
(3), while the MNC’s acquisition profits are given by the levels attained from 
monopolizing the market minus the purchasing price of the local firm.  Appendix 1 
provides profit levels for each entry mode as a function of market size and competition.  
 
3. Optimal Entry: FDI, Trade or Acquisition 
  The MNC’s entry decision depends on the relative profitability of FDI, trade and 
acquisition. Given the demand derived from (1), (2) and the general profit levels in (3) 
and (3a), we can derive the equilibrium profit level for both firms as a function of entry 
                                                 
7 Two general observations are in order. First, in the case of a local monopoly, profit maximization implies 
that the local firm may not cover market demand.  Once the MNC enters the market, however, the entire 
market will be covered. Second, for cL  s, the local firm will not enter the market because of negative 
profits. 
≥
  8modes, FDI fixed costs, market sizes, tariffs/transport costs, and degrees of competition 
between firms.  
3.1    Competition and Entry Modes 
  The optimal entry decisions can be conveniently distinguished by the degree of 
competition in the host market. Three cases result: first, sufficiently high competition 
allow that only one firm can survive, namely the firm with lower marginal costs. In this 
case, the local firm is always driven out of the market once the MNC enters the market 
through FDI or trade.
8  In the second case, which involves high levels of competition, the 
MNC may or may not be able to drive out the local firm, depending on the level of fixed 
costs and tariffs. Optimal entry in this case is examined in detail in section 3.1.2 below. 
  The most interesting analysis is generated by sufficiently weak competition (or strong 
product differentiation), which allows both firms to remain in the market at all times. In 
this case, the entry mode is a function of fixed costs, trade/transportation costs and local 
market size. Market size becomes a decisive factor when firms coexist because aggregate 
profits increase in s. In addition, if markets are sufficiently large, both firms can set 
goods’ prices without demand constraints. For critically small markets, however, the 
existence of two firms implies that the MNC and the local firm interact strategically to 
lower prices (and reduce profits) to remain competitive. This case is examined in the next 
section, 3.1.1. 
                                                 
8 According to appendix 1,
I
M π =cL − M ct k − −  and 
T




L π = 0.  Hence, the 
local firm is always driven out from the market when the MNC enters through FDI or trade.  Acquisition is 
also possible, as the exact entry mode depends in a simple fashion linearly on market size, fixed costs, and 
trade barriers.  For   the MNC’s optimal entry is acquisition if  t 2 c s L + > ϑ − − > L c s 2 M c .  For  t c s L 2 + <  
acquisition occurs at  () t ϑ − c c M L − cL + > 2 s  where  k = ϑ  or τ + δ.  When market size falls below the 
critical value for each case, the MNC enters only through FDI or trade, depending on the relative 
magnitudes of k and τ+δ. 
  93.1.1  Entry with Low Degrees of Competition  
  Commencing with a low degree of competition  M L M L c c t c c − < ≤ − 3 ) ( , allows 
us to focus on variations in fixed costs, market size, tariffs, and transport costs as key 
determinants of the MNC’s optimal entry mode.  All proofs for this section are relegated 
to appendix 2.  The multitude of entry cases is best summarized in Figures 1-4. Each 
figure represents combinations of market sizes (vertical axis), fixed costs (horizontal 
axis) and optimal entry modes (color codes).
9  Tariff/transport costs increase from Figure 
1 to Figure 4.  On the axes of the Figures we indicate the threshold market sizes and fixed 
cost levels associated with changes in entry modes.  For example, in the case of low 
competition and low tariffs (Figure 2) fixed costs higher than the threshold level k4 allow 
for three entry modes: no entry, trade and acquisition, depending on the size of the 
market.  The vertical axis indicates that the MNC never enters markets smaller than s9.  
As soon as the home market is larger than s9, the MNC enters with trade, and once 
market size s2 is superseded, the MNC acquires the domestic firm.  All threshold levels 
are provided in the appendix. 
The figures show clear trends.  Starting with Figure 1, free trade and proximity to 
the MNC’s foreign production site exclude FDI as a potential entry mode, regardless of 
market size or fixed costs.  No matter whether trade is free or transport costs are 
negligible, sufficiently large markets always entice an MNC to purchase the local firm, 
not only to become the monopoly producer, but also because trade is a powerful threat 
that lowers the acquisition price.   
                                                 
9 We simplify the entry mode representation further by assuming cT < cL+ t. 
  10  In Figure 2, the case of low tariffs and transport costs, FDI replaces trade under 
low fixed costs. This represents the MNC’s marginal cost advantage for FDI relative to 
trade in countries that impose small fixed costs and moderate tariffs. As fixed costs rise, 
the profitability of FDI diminishes and the MNC resorts to acquisition for large markets, 
trade in intermediate markets, and no entry in small markets. Neither acquisition nor 
trade is attractive in small markets because insufficient demand depresses prices to the 
degree that tariffs or acquisition costs cannot be covered.  Interestingly, as fixed costs 
rise, trade emerges first in large markets. This is because the marginal cost advantage of 
FDI becomes less significant in large markets where MNCs can set prices without 
demand constraints. As the market size declines, the price pressures increase, reducing 
the likelihood that the MNC can cover its costs under tariffs. Rising fixed costs, however, 
increase the threshold market size for FDI. As in Figure 1, very large markets are covered 
by acquisition since the MNC can use FDI (for small fixed costs) and trade (under high 
fixed costs) as threats to reduce the purchasing price. 
  For high tariffs and transport costs, Figure 3 indicates that the entry mode shifts 
strongly in favor of acquisition and FDI. Trade disappears first from small markets, 
where price pressures highlight the importance of low marginal costs. Weak levels of 
competition thus permit all three entry modes to remain viable, even when high tariffs or 
transport costs render the MNC’s marginal cost greater than the local firm’s. At the same 
time, this regime highlights the importance of entry threats. As rising fixed costs render 
FDI no longer viable, and since trade is unprofitable due to high tariffs and transport 
costs, the model predicts that acquisition is the dominant entry mode.  Following the 
pattern in Figure 2, FDI disappears in smaller markets because low prices cannot cover 
  11progressively rising fixed costs.  In large and intermediate markets, acquisition profits 
soon outweigh trade profits because FDI is still an entry threat when fixed costs are 
relatively low. As the FDI entry threat disappears, trade and acquisition via trade threats 
remain the only entry modes. As above, trade is only viable in sufficiently large markets 
with sufficiently high prices.  
  Figure 4 replicates the case of prohibitive tariffs and transport costs, which render a 
degenerate choice between FDI, acquisition, or no entry to the MNC. The triangular 
shape of FDI has two reasons.  First, the increasing fixed costs command higher prices, 
which are not attainable in relatively small markets.  Secondly, in very large markets FDI 
is less profitable than acquisition which delivers monopoly power as the simple FDI 
threat sufficiently reduces the acquisition price.  High fixed costs and tariffs thus insulate 
a country from entry by the MNC.  As was pointed out by Mueller (2001), very large 
markets cannot be covered by acquisition with prohibitive trade and investment barriers 
because neither FDI nor trade can be used as an entry threat.  
3.1.2  Optimal Entry with High Levels of Competition 
  The previous section assumes that competition is sufficiently low to sustain both 
firms at all times. As we increase the level of competition, however, the MNC’s marginal 
cost advantage can drive out the domestic firm. We utilize the same format as above to 
summarize the entry modes for high competition levels as a function of tariffs and 
transport costs in Figures 5-8. Proofs are provided in appendix 3. 
Compared to Figures 1-4, increased competition invokes more aggressive entry 
behavior on the part of the MNC in the target market.  High competition, Figures 5-8 
generates a similar overall trend as in the low competition cases (Figures 1-4).  While the 
  12evolution of the entry pattern is similar, closer comparison reveals important differences.  
A comparison between appendix 2 and appendix 3 reveals that the threshold magnitudes, 
which denote trade, acquisition, FDI, and no entry, differ significantly.  Intuitively, the 
fundamental difference between the two cases is that under high degrees of competition 
FDI becomes a powerful tool to drive the local firm out of the market.   
  In small markets, greater competition allows the foreign firm to better take advantage 
of its lower marginal costs.  This now allows FDI even in small markets (in Figures 6-8 
vs. Figures 2-4) since FDI may now capture the entire market, to generate sufficient 
demand to cover fixed costs.  By the same reasoning, increased competition raises the 
FDI acquisition threat.  This lowers the acquisition threshold market size and allows for 
acquisition even in small markets (only if fixed costs are sufficiently high to rule out 
FDI).  As tariffs and transport costs rise in Figures 5-8, the export option retreats in the 
same pattern and for the same reason as in Figures 1-4.  
3.2    Data on Entry into Transition Economies 
Charting Wooster’s (2002) data of U.S. MNCs’ entry modes across transition 
countries and across time in Figures 9 and 10 yields support for a number of predictions 
of the model.
10  Figure 9 shows the prevalence of entry modes over time, while Figure 10 
ranks countries by GDP (increasing from left to right).  The data provides support for the 
implication that market size and acquisition are positively related – with the clear 
exception of Ukraine and Russia.  If the latter two countries are ignored, the correlation 
                                                 
10 Wooster’s data examines the entry decisions of 217 US corporations undertaking 491 projects.  Her data 
separates between different entry modes such as pure acquisition FDI, non-FDI related export sales, and 
new FDI (joint venture financed and new plants).  Exports refer only to shipments from the US corporation 
to the target country.  The dataset is large relative to comparable studies; e.g., Lankes and Venables feature 
117 companies with 145 projects.  
  13between market size and acquisition is .8, and if Ukraine is included the correlation drops 
to .68.  It is tempting to speculate that these two very large economies lack the predicted 
amount of acquisition because of the absence of the rule of law. Liberalization indicators 
for the two countries are below the sample average (see de Melo et al 1996 and IMF 
2000).  While there is no correlation between FDI and market size, exports and market 
size are strongly correlated with a .84 correlation coefficient.  The model predicts that in 
relatively protected economies, especially for intermediate fixed costs, trade will increase 
with market size.   
Strong support for our model is also provided by the analysis of the relatively small 
markets. With the exception of Armenia and Kyrgyzstan, all of the small markets are 
served by exports (the establishment of sales offices).  The next most popular entry mode 
in small markets is FDI; acquisitions are rare in small countries, which is consistent with 
our model of low competition in the face of moderate fixed costs to FDI.  
During the early stages of transition trade costs fell significantly.  Since then, trade 
costs have never been thought to inhibit commerce more than the absence of institutions. 
Hence, the most commonly used liberalization index includes both tariffs and 
institutional variables.  As we examine the entry modes over time, as trade costs fall 
largely across countries, and as the above-mentioned liberalization indices increase in all 
countries, FDI is initially significantly more attractive.  Later exports begin to dominate.  
  14 
Figure 9 



















































Source: Wooster’s (2002) 
Figure 10 












































Source: Wooster’s (2002) 
  15The data is presented simply to provide a general idea of the pattern of FDI in transition 
economies.  Even though the sample is large compared to other transition studies, there 
are a number of reasons in the real world and in the model that determine the entry 
behavior.  The degree of competition for each firm is not known, but it plays a crucial 
role in the model.  Also, the exact degree of trade costs is impossible to ascertain, 
although liberalization indices are available which combine both tariff costs and country 
specific institutional fixed costs.   
4. Trade Policy and Welfare  
4.1 Tariffs and Firm Welfare 
  It is natural to inquire to what degree trade and tariffs help or hurt both the domestic 
firm and the MNC. Clearly, the MNC is better off whenever it chooses trade over FDI. 
Tariffs, on the other hand, reduce the profitability of exports and reduce the MNC’s 
market demand. Hence, tariffs are unambiguously profit-reducing for the MNC.  
  Clearly, trade decreases welfare for the local firm as the move from prohibitive tariffs 
to free trade increases competition, lowers market demand for the domestic good and 
reduces the good’s price.  For these reasons, the domestic firm will lobby for protection.  
  There exists, however, a possibility for the local firm to benefit from trade. Moving 
from prohibitive to positive tariffs, an MNC might find it profitable to forgo FDI with 
high fixed costs and export instead. Since the MNC and the local firm engage in a pricing 
game, the goods are strategic complements. The MNC’s switching from FDI to trade 
(under positive tariffs) in the face of strategic complementarity implies that the domestic 
price increases. This generates a net benefit to the local firm if the loss in market share is 
offset by a sufficiently large price increase. 
  164.2    Endogenous Trade Policy 
  Thus far, we have focused on the local firm’s profit levels in response to exogenously 
set tariffs. The tariff itself can be seen as a policy variable, as shown by voluminous 
endogenous protection literature (Hillman, 1982; Findlay and Wellisz, 1982; Magee 
Brock and Young, 1989; and Grossman and Helpman, 1994, 1996). In this section, we 
examine the factors that determine an endogenous tariff to maximize local interest 
groups’ welfare levels and to influence the MNC’s entry mode. 
  We follow Hillman’s (1982) approach to tariff formation by stipulating a political 
support function, W( L π , C), which consists of domestic firm’s profits,  L π , and net 
consumer surplus, C.
11  In the political support approach to tariff formation, the 
government trades off political support from consumers against higher industry profits. 
Support for the government from industry increases in tariffs and in industry’s profits, 
while consumers increase their support when product prices decline.  Much like in 
Staiger and Tabellini (1987), the government does not have a self-interested motive other 
than redistribution to minimize the loss to either constituency; tariffs revenue is 
redistributed lump sum.   
  It is thus possible to interpret the model as one in which an altruistic government 
chooses a tariff to maximize aggregate support from its constituents.  The literature on 
endogenous tariff formation has also included government preferences over 
contributions/bribes, which may be especially relevant for transition economies.   
Empirical estimates of government weights on non-altruistic components in its objective 
function turn out to be extremely low (see Gawande and Bandyopadhyay 2000, Goldberg 
                                                 
11 We assume that W[.]is well-behaved, i.e.,  0 , 0 , 0 , 0 ; 0 = < < > > C cc c L L L L andW W W W π π π π W  
  17and Maggi 1999, and Eicher and Osang 2002).  For simplicity we abstract from bribery 
and contributions below, so that the government maximizes political support by choosing 
a tariff that maximizes the political support function, or   












π      (4) 
where  x W x ∂ ∂ = W .     
  The domestic firm’s profits are derived as above and consumer welfare is derived 
from the fact that x consumers derive utility  L sp t x − −  from the domestic good and  x − 1  
consumers achieve utility  ( ) x t p s F − − − 1  by consuming the MNC’s good. Hence, net 
consumer surplus  
   (5)  () ( ) () ( ) ( ∫ ∫ = = − + − − − + = − − − + − −
1 2
0 5 . 1 1
x i L F F
x
i L x p t tx t x p s di i t p s di ti p s )
depends critically on the size of the market.  We differentiate between large and 
intermediate market size to determine the optimal tariff as the government maximizes its 
political support.
12 
4.2.1. Large Market Size 
  Appendix 4 proves that in sufficiently large markets,  s t c c T L ≤ + + 2 / ) 3 ( , the 
government sets the optimal tariff according to  


















,     ( 6 a )  
                                                 
12 Small markets do not entail interesting strategic firm behavior in the Hotelling setup; hence the literature 
has traditionally considered markets that are sufficiently large to generate strategic behavior.  We follow 
Verboven (1998) and others as we neglect this case. 
  18where  C π ε  is the marginal rate of transformation between profits and net consumer 
surplus in the government’s welfare function, which increases the tariff.  Fortunately the 
empirical literature provides good guidance that governments’ weights on consumer 
welfare are always significantly larger than their consideration of firm benefits from 
protection (see Gawande and Krishna (forthcoming) for a survey).  Hence we examine 
C π ε  < 1 as the only relevant case. 
  The tariff increases in the marginal cost of the local firm, cL, rendering the 
government more likely to protect inefficient local firms that face stronger cost 
competition from abroad.  In the same vein, the tariff increases as the MNC’s marginal 
cost and transport costs fall to protect profits of the local firm.  The tariff level is 
discontinuous in the degree of monopoly power. Tariffs are positively (negatively) 
related to the monopoly power for high (low) levels of  C π ε .
13 Monopoly power provides 
the local firm with a greater ability to raise prices (and profits) in response to tariffs. 
Hence a tariff is attractive for the government in this case. If the government is, however, 
significantly more interested in consumer surplus than firm profits, it will lower the tariff 
even for monopolistic industries, in order to encourage competition from the MNC.  Note 
that whenever the tariff increases, the MNC’s choice of entry mode is impacted as 
analyzed in section 3. 
4.2.2  Intermediate Market Size 
  For intermediate market sizes, ( 2 / ) 3 ( 3 / ) 3 2 t c c s t c c T L T L + + < ≤ + + , appendix 4 
proves the endogenous tariff to be  
                                                 
13 The critical level of  C , π ε  is  .  3 / 2
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Here the comparative statics are similar to the large market case, with two notable 
exceptions. First and foremost, market size matters in intermediate markets, because the 
MNC and the local firm are constraint in their price movements by demand.  Secondly, 
the tariff decreases in the market size, as the government has a stronger incentive to lower 
trade barriers for larger markets, to the benefit of consumers' surplus. The tariff function 
then implies that expanding market size should lead to freer trade. In contrast to the large 
markets, tariffs now increase unambiguously in monopoly power since price pressures, 
due to constraint market demand, curbs the local firm's ability to raise prices after having 
been awarded a tariff.  This renders the government concerned about protecting the 
consumers’ welfare.  As in the large market case, tariffs increase in local firms’ marginal 
costs and decrease in the MNC’s marginal and transport costs. 
5. Concluding remarks 
  We investigate how MNCs’ optimal entry modes depend on the market size, on fixed 
costs of FDI, tariffs/transport costs and on competition. Consistent with the results of 
previous research in this area, we show that low trade barriers favor international trade 
over other entry options on the part of the MNC. As trade barriers increase, however, we 
find that trade becomes viable only in intermediate sized markets. For insufficient market 
demand, depressed price levels render it less likely that the MNC can overcome trade 
barriers. Instead, FDI can subsist in those markets due to the MNC’s advantage in 
  20production cost over the local firm. High fixed investment costs increase the threshold 
market size for FDI, which cannot be offset unless trade barriers are sufficiently low to 
allow for the MNC’s export penetration. 
  With sufficiently high trade barriers, the MNC favors acquisition over trade as long as 
FDI fixed costs are not too large to allow for FDI as an entry threat. Moreover, large 
markets give rise to acquisition, independent of trade barriers, because the monopoly 
power derived from acquisitions pays handsomely in very large markets.  When we 
consider the case of high competition, FDI becomes the predominant entry mode, which 
allows the MNC’s to exploit the full benefits of its ownership advantage.   
  Analyzing the welfare implications of the entry modes, we show that trade barriers 
protect the local firm’s welfare at the expense of MNC profits. Hence, the MNC will 
pursue free international trade while the local firm will seek high protection from its 
government. One interesting result, stemming from the strategic complementarity 
between domestic and import goods, is that the local firm may attain higher profits under 
trade with protection than under MNC’s FDI entry.  This leads us to investigate the 
incentives of policy makers who set tariffs endogenously in order to maximize welfare 
and influence specific MNC entry modes.  We show that an endogenous tariff that 
maximizes a government’s political support increases in the marginal cost of the local 
firm and decreases in the level of competition between firms.   
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A) Endogenous Tariff in Large Markets  
 
Substituting profits  L π = t t c c L T 18 ) 3 (
2 + −
(
, consumer surplus C , 
equilibrium demand x=
x p t tx t x p s L F ) ( 5 . ) 1 (
2 − + − − − + =
) t t p p L F 2 + − , and equilibrium prices  () 3 3 2 t c c p T L L + + = , 
() 3 2   c c p L T F + + = 3t , in the political support function the government’s optimization yields  
 
   () () 0 18 9 9 3 = − − + + ∂ ∂ + + − + + ∂ ∂ = t t c c C W t t c c W
d
dW




Assuming a constant marginal rate of transformation,  ( ) ( ) τ τ π επ d dC d d L C / / , − = , we can solve for the tariff 
function  ( ) ( ) σ ε ε τ π π − − + + − = F L C C c c t 2 2 3 3 * , , . 
 
B)  Endogenous Tariffs in Intermediate Markets 
 
In the intermediate sized markets, local profits change to  L π = ( ) ( )() t t c c t c c s L T T L 6 3 6 3 5 6 + − − − − , 
generating equilibrium prices  () 6 3t c c s p L T L + − − = ,  ( ) 6 3   t c c s T L pF + − − = .  The maximization of 
the political support function then yields  
   () () 0 18 18 3 2 3 = − + + ∂ ∂ + − − − − − ∂ ∂ = t c c C W t t c c s W
d
dW
L F F L L σ τ σ τ π
τ
 
to yield the tariff function  () ( ) ( ) σ ε ε τ π π − − − − − − = F C L L C c c t c s 1 3 2 3 * , ,  
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